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Cooperators benefit others with paying costs. Evolution of cooperation crucially depends on the
cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, denoted as c. In this work, we investigate the infinitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma for various values of c with four of the representative memory-one strategies,
i.e., unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, tit-for-tat, and win-stay-lose-shift. We
consider replicator dynamics which deterministically describes how the fraction of each strategy
evolves over time in an infinite-sized well-mixed population in the presence of implementation error
and mutation among the four strategies. Our finding is that this three-dimensional continuous-
time dynamics exhibits chaos through a bifurcation sequence similar to that of a logistic map as c
varies. If mutation occurs with rate µ ≪ 1, the position of the bifurcation sequence on the c axis
is numerically found to scale as µ0.1, and such sensitivity to µ suggests that mutation may have
non-perturbative effects on evolutionary paths. It demonstrates how the microscopic randomness of
the mutation process can be amplified to macroscopic unpredictability by evolutionary dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of “evolutionary progress” has been de-
bated ever since Darwin [1], and most evolutionary biolo-
gists dismiss the idea that evolution is directional change
toward the better [2]. A counterexample to progression-
ism is self-extinction caused by individual adaptation [3],
which is directional change towards the worse by any
measure. For example, transgenic males of Japanese
medaka fish Oryzias latipes have larger body sizes than
the wild-type counterparts and thus enjoy advantages in
mating, but they tend to decrease the population size
because their offspring have lower fecundity [4]. Here,
individual interests contradict with the collective inter-
est of the population [5], as is often modeled by the pris-
oner’s dilemma (PD) game. The PD game thus provides
us with an analytic model in which selection works in
an undesirable direction. However, one could even ask
whether evolution is directional after all, and progres-
sionism will lose big ground if chaos proves ubiquitous in
evolution, i.e., marking natural history as unpredictable
alternations of progression and retrogression. In fact, a
recent study indicates that chaos becomes more likely as
the dimensionality of the phenotype space increases [6],
and the possibility is greatly enhanced by discrete-time
dynamics, especially when one considers a wide range
of parameters [7]. For example, chaos in the iterated
version of the PD game has been reported among 10
different strategies under frequency-dependent selection
in discrete time [8]. On the other hand, chaos in low-
dimensional continuous dynamics is a more challenging
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issue, considering that chaos is impossible when the di-
mensionality of the strategy space is less than three [9].
In this work, we report chaoticity in three-dimensional
(3D) continuous-time mutation-selection dynamics of the
iterated PD game with varying the cost-benefit ratio
of cooperation. By choosing the PD game as a micro-
scopic foundation, we put our problem into the con-
text of conflict between individual and collective inter-
ests in a biological population. In particular, compared
with the generic model in Ref. [6], we will see that our
approach directly relates unpredictability to mutation,
whereas self-extinction can be driven solely by selection,
so that it naturally incorporates another key argument
of non-progressionism, i.e., historical contingency of mu-
tation [10].
This work is organized as follows: We explain the basic
formulation of our dynamical system in the next section.
Section III shows numerical results, which will be dis-
cussed in Sec. IV from the viewpoint of time reversal.
We will then summarize this work in Sec. V.
II. METHOD
The PD game is a symmetric two-person game defined
by the following payoff table for the row player:
 C DC b− c −c
D b 0

 , (1)
where C and D denote two possible moves, i.e., cooper-
ation and defection, respectively. Note that the payoff
table is parametrized by b and c which we assume to sat-
isfy b > c > 0. If you choose to cooperate, it implies that
it benefits your coplayer by an amount of b at the expense
of your own cost c. This is the reason that your payoff
2becomes −c whereas the coplayer earns +b when you co-
operate and the coplayer defects [Eq. (1)]. Even if we
begin with a group of cooperating individuals, a defect-
ing trait will invade and take over the population as soon
as it comes into existence through mutation, which is
comparable to the scenario of self-extinction [3]. The sit-
uation changes when the PD game is iterated between the
pair of players so that an individual may adopt a strat-
egy according to which cooperation is conditioned on the
past interaction with the coplayer. A famous conditional
cooperator of this sort is tit-for-tat (TFT), which coop-
erates at the first round and then copies the coplayer’s
previous move at each subsequent round [11]. Another
important strategy is win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS), which
attempts a different move from the previous one if it did
not earn a positive payoff [12]. Both TFT and WSLS be-
long to a class of memory-one strategies in the sense that
they refer to only the previous round in making decisions.
These conditional cooperators achieve a high level of co-
operation based on reciprocity when the cost of cooper-
ation is low enough [13]. Some animal societies seem to
have developed such behavior [14]. To contrast those con-
ditional strategies with unconditional ones, we denote a
strategy of unconditional cooperation (defection) as AllC
(AllD) henceforth. Although the unconditional strategies
are memoryless, they are also members of the memory-
one strategy class with trivial dependence on the past
memory. These are the most extensively studied strate-
gies, so the following strategy set will be considered in
this work: S ≡ {AllC, AllD, TFT, WSLS}.
Let us consider the case when a player with strategy
i ∈ S plays the iterated PD game against the coplayer
with strategy j ∈ S. At each round, they can occupy
one of the following states: (C,C), (C,D), (D,C), and
(D,D). Suppose that the result is (α, β), or in short αβ,
at a current round (α, β ∈ {C,D}). Based on this result,
each player’s strategy prescribes cooperation with certain
probability, which is either zero or one. The probability
that the player (coplayer) with strategy i (j) cooperates
at the next round is denoted by qαβ (rβα). For example,
for a player with AllC, qαβ = 1 for all states of αβ, while
for a player with TFT, q
CC
= q
DC
= 1 and q
CD
= q
DD
=
0 (for details, see Appendix A). The values of rβα can
be similarly assigned. In the presence of implementation
error with probability ǫ ∈ (0, 1), the probabilities are
effectively changed to q′αβ = (1− ǫ)qαβ + ǫ(1− qαβ) and
r′βα = (1 − ǫ)rβα + ǫ(1 − rβα), respectively. By defining
q¯′αβ ≡ 1 − q
′
αβ and r¯
′
βα ≡ 1 − r
′
βα, the transition matrix
between the current and next states is written as
M =


q′
CC
r′
CC
q′
CD
r′
DC
q′
DC
r′
CD
q′
DD
r′
DD
q′
CC
r¯′
CC
q′
CD
r¯′
DC
q′
DC
r¯′
CD
q′
DD
r¯′
DD
q¯′
CC
r′
CC
q¯′
CD
r′
DC
q¯′
DC
r′
CD
q¯′
DD
r′
DD
q¯′
CC
r¯′
CC
q¯′
CD
r¯′
DC
q¯′
DC
r¯′
CD
q¯′
DD
r¯′
DD

 , (2)
which admits a unique right eigenvector ~v =
(v
CC
, v
CD
, v
DC
, v
DD
) with eigenvalue one according to the
Perron-Frobenius theorem. We normalize ~v by requiring
v
CC
+ v
CD
+ v
DC
+ v
DD
= 1 to take it as stationary prob-
ability distribution over the four states. Note that the
existence of error with ǫ > 0 makes the initial state ir-
relevant in the long run. This procedure is applied to
every pair of strategies i and j in S. By taking the in-
ner product between the resulting ~v with a payoff vector
(b−c,−c, b, 0), we calculate the long-term payoff aij that
strategy i obtains against j (see Appendix A for details).
Let xi(t) denote the fraction of strategy i ∈ S at time
t. If the population is infinitely large, xi can be regarded
as a real variable. The payoff of strategy i, denoted by
pi(t), is given as pi(t) =
∑
j aijxj(t) if the population is
well-mixed. The population average payoff will thus be
〈p〉 (t) ≡
∑
i pi(t)xi(t) =
∑
ij aijxi(t)xj(t). We describe
the mutation-selection dynamics of the population using
the replicator dynamics (RD) [15, 16] as follows:
dxi
dt
= fi ≡ (1− µ)pixi − 〈p〉xi +
µ
|S| − 1
∑
j 6=i
pjxj , (3)
where µ denotes the rate of mutation. We have only three
degrees of freedom because |S| = 4 and
∑
i∈S xi(t) =
1 all the time. The system described by Eq. (3)
is therefore understood as a deterministic dynamical
system inside a 3D region, defined as Ω = {x ≡
(x
AllD
, x
TFT
, x
WSLS
)|x
AllD
≥ 0, x
TFT
≥ 0, x
WSLS
≥ 0, and
x
AllD
+x
TFT
+ x
WSLS
≤ 1}. Note that the time scale gov-
erning the RD has been assumed to be much larger than
that for calculating the “long-term” payoffs. Our main
finding is that the dynamics of Eq. (3) exhibits chaos in
this Ω when µ > 0. Our system is minimal to be chaotic,
and this minimal system helps us understand the role of
mutation in analytic terms.
III. RESULT
Numerically, we integrate this set of ordinary differen-
tial equations for every i ∈ S by means of the fourth-
order Runge-Kutta method, with enforcing the normal-
ization condition
∑
i∈S xi(t) = 1 at any time t. We set
b = 1 without loss of generality, and take ǫ = 10−2 as the
probability of error. We choose ∆t = 10−2 as the incre-
mental time interval for numerical integration through-
out this work. Note that the RD depends on the initial
condition at t = 0 due to its deterministic nature. It is
therefore important to probe many different initial con-
ditions to obtain the full picture. In Fig. 1(a), we assume
µ = 10−4 and plot the time average of xi,
x¯i ≡
1
t2 − t1
∫ t2
t1
xi(t)dt, (4)
which removes transient dynamics for 0 ≤ t < t1 with
t1 ≫ O(1) and considers the history up to t2 > t1.
For each value of c, we have checked roughly 2 × 104
different initial conditions for x = (x
AllD
, x
TFT
, x
WSLS
)
in Iδ ≡ {(0, 0, 0), (0, 0, δ), (0, 0, 2δ), . . . , (1, 0, 0)} with
δ = 148 . If we take c = 0.2, for example, we find from
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FIG. 1. (Color online) (a) Fractions of strategies averaged
over long time [Eq. (4)], started from various initial condi-
tions (see the main text). The vertical dotted line indicates
c = 1
2
, and the two oblique dotted lines represent x
TFT
≈ c
and x
AllD
≈
1−c
2
, respectively. (b) Attractor for c = 0.46
as a stable limit cycle, which rotates counterclockwise if pro-
jected onto the (x
TFT
, x
AllD
) plane. The small circles rep-
resent local maxima of x
WSLS
along the trajectory, and the
cross indicates a mutation-free fixed point (FP) written as
x∗0 =
(
1−2ǫ−c
2−4ǫ
, c
1−2ǫ
, 0
)
. (c) Basins of attraction for c = 0.46,
where the horizontal and vertical coordinates indicate x
AllD
and x
TFT
, respectively. These are cross-sectional views at dif-
ferent values of x
WSLS
from 0
48
to 6
48
. The basin of attraction
for a cycle as shown in (b) is denoted in red, AllD FP with
x∗ = (1, 0, 0) in green, and WSLS FP with x∗ = (0, 0, 1) in
blue.
Fig. 1(a) that the system has two different attractors,
characterized by x∗ ≈ (1, 0, 0) and x∗ ≈ (0, 0, 1), re-
spectively, depending on the initial condition. The lat-
ter fixed point (FP) disappears as c roughly exceeds 12 ,
and this is readily explained by the FP analysis: When
µ = 0, Eq. (3) has 11 different FP’s, one of which is
x
∗
0 = (0, 0, 1). Its eigenvalues are all negative when c lies
below a certain threshold cth =
(1−2ǫ)2
2−4ǫ+4ǫ2 ≈
1
2−ǫ, whereas
one of them becomes positive for c > cth (see Appendix B
for details). In terms of evolutionary biology, we can also
say that the WSLS-dominant FP is an evolutionarily sta-
ble state (ESS) for c < cth, noting that an ESS consti-
tutes an asymptotically stable FP in RD [15]. Figure 1(a)
also shows that the distribution of attractors changes
qualitatively as c increases. Roughly speaking, if c >∼ 0.4,
we can observe another attractor whose time average is
approximated as x¯ = (x¯
AllD
, x¯
TFT
, x¯
WSLS
) ≈
(
1−c
2 , c, η
)
with a small positive number η. This attractor actually
corresponds to a cycle, and Fig. 1(b) shows an example
for c = 0.46. By a cycle, we do not only mean an ordinary
limit cycle of finite periodicity but also a quasi-periodic
or strange attractor of an infinite period. Figure 1(c)
provides tomographic views of the basins of attraction
with different values of x
WSLS
(t = 0). The basins have
very complicated boundaries on the (x
AllD
, x
TFT
) plane
and gradually merge as we increase x
WSLS
in the initial
0
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FIG. 2. (Color online) (a) Largest Lyapunov exponent λ1
when it is positive, and local maxima of x
WSLS
(t) [see the
circles in Fig. 1(b)] at various values of c. We check many
different cycles to estimate the average and standard error of
λ1. The big horizontal arrow shows the size of the main bi-
furcation structure, and the long vertical rectangle indicates
c = 0.453, at which chaos fully develops. Inset: return map
between the nth and (n+1)th maxima of xWSLS at c = 0.453.
(b) Time series of xWSLS at c = 0.475 (upper) and c = 0.453
(lower), after removing transient dynamics for t1 ≫ O(1).
The two lines of the upper panel are obtained with different
initial conditions. (c) Left and right ends of the main bifur-
cation structure [see the horizontal arrow in (a)] as a function
of µ on the log-log scale. We have additionally plotted µ0.1
for comparison.
condition. Therefore, although WSLS can stabilize coop-
eration for c < cth, it depends on initial conditions, and
one cannot easily choose a correct one if beginning with
low x
WSLS
.
The complicated geometry of the basins of attrac-
tion suggests the possibility of chaos [17]. To quan-
tify chaoticity, we calculate Lyapunov exponents with
LyapOde4 [18], which is based on the QR decomposition
method [19]. In Fig. 2(a), we plot the largest Lyapunov
exponent λ1 when it is estimated as positive (see Ap-
pendix C for details). The result supports the existence
of chaos. Furthermore, we can explicitly construct a bi-
furcation diagram [Fig. 2(a)] by plotting local maxima
of x
WSLS
[the circles in Fig. 1(b)] at various values of c.
The bifurcation structure is reminiscent of that of the lo-
gistic map, and the similarity can be made more precise
by plotting a return map between the nth and (n+ 1)th
maxima when the system is chaotic [inset of Fig. 2(a)].
4We also note that Fig. 2(a) shows many other lines than
the bifurcation diagram because two different cycles can
coexist at the same c depending on their initial condi-
tions. For example, the upper panel of Fig. 2(b) depicts
two time series of x
WSLS
at c = 0.475: the solid line shows
two alternating peaks, whereas the dashed line is char-
acterized by gradually growing peaks followed by a quiet
stage. As c decreases, the former cycle undergoes period
doubling to chaos [the lower panel in Fig. 2(b)], but the
latter one still remains stable with finite periodicity. Al-
though unpredictable, the dynamics exhibits a variety of
correlations that we can make use of. For example, the
maximum of x
WSLS
provides a precursor for that of x
AllD
because it is correlated with how close the trajectory gets
to the state of x
AllD
= 1 before turning toward the state
of x
TFT
= 1 [see Fig. 1(b)].
The position of the main bifurcation structure is ex-
tremely sensitive to the variation of µ: Fig. 2(c) shows
the left and right ends of the main bifurcation structure,
represented by the horizontal arrow in Fig. 2(a). Ac-
cording to our numerical observation, they are roughly
proportional to µ0.1. If the power-law behavior holds for
µ → 0, the bifurcation structure will shrink and eventu-
ally disappear as mutation occurs less and less frequently.
The exponent is unexpectedly small, and this sensitivity
to µ is consistent with the following observation: Sup-
pose that we have a FP x∗0 when mutation is absent,
i.e., µ = 0. The corresponding FP x∗ in the presence
of small µ > 0 cannot be obtained directly but approx-
imated through a perturbative calculation [20]. By de-
noting f(x) ≡ (f
AllD
(x), f
TFT
(x), f
WSLS
(x)), we obtain
x
∗ ≈ x∗0 − J(x
∗
0)
−1 · f(x∗0), (5)
if the Jacobian matrix J =
{
∂fi
∂xj
}
has an inverse at
x = x∗0 (see Appendix D for details). The last term
on the right-hand side of Eq. (5) describes displacement
of the FP due to mutation and it is expected to be of
an order of µ in this perturbative approach. However,
this is not the case if we look at a mutation-free FP
x
∗
0 =
(
1−2ǫ−c
2−4ǫ ,
c
1−2ǫ , 0
)
, which is close to x¯ ≈
(
1−c
2 , c, η
)
,
the time average of the cycle in Fig. 1(b): We rather find
that ∂fWSLS
∂xi
is only of an order of µ for every i ∈ S, so
that the naive perturbative analysis of Eq. (5) yields dis-
placement of O(1). Note that it does not vanish in the
limit of µ → 0, contrary to our expectation. The failure
in the perturbative estimate of x∗ nevertheless suggests
that mutation can greatly affect the FP structure near
the limit cycle.
IV. DISCUSSION
Whenever an ESS exists, it is an asymptotically stable
FP in the mutation-free RD, i.e., Eq. (3) with µ = 0,
and a local Lyapunov function can be constructed in the
vicinity of this FP [15, 16]. However, RD may have differ-
ent types of attractors such as a limit cycle and a strange
attractor, and we then have no systematic way to regard
the dynamic evolution as optimization of a certain target
function. In this context, it is worth noting that RD has
emergent symmetry [20]: Let us denote
dx
AllC
/dt ≡ f
AllC
(x
AllC
, x
AllD
) (6)
dx
AllD
/dt ≡ f
AllD
(x
AllC
, x
AllD
) (7)
with setting x
WSLS
= µ = 0. Then, the following equality
holds:
f
AllC
(x
AllC
, x
AllD
) + f
AllD
(x
AllD
, x
AllC
) = 0. (8)
Therefore, if we redefine X
AllC
≡ x
AllD
, X
AllD
≡ x
AllC
,
and τ ≡ −t, we find from Eq. (8) that
dX
AllC
/dτ = f
AllC
(X
AllC
, X
AllD
) (9)
dX
AllD
/dτ = f
AllD
(X
AllC
, X
AllD
), (10)
recovering the original dynamics in Eqs. (6) and (7)
(see Appendix E for more detailed derivation). In other
words, if both x
WSLS
and µ are strictly zero, the dynam-
ics is dual to itself under time reversal and exchange be-
tween AllC and AllD. The duality implies that our two-
dimensional dynamics cannot have a global Lyapunov
function: If a function V (x
AllC
= x1, xAllD = x2) has a
positive time derivative, V (x2, x1) must be a decreasing
function of time. Loosely speaking, therefore, if WSLS
was absent, it would be impossible to define the arrow
of time for the whole system based solely on selection.
We have two ways for directionality at this point: One
is to incorporate x
WSLS
> 0 into dynamics to let the
system converge to the corresponding ESS through se-
lection. The other is to keep x
WSLS
at zero but intro-
duce µ > 0 and redefine the arrow of time in terms
of mutation. For example, the FP x∗, modified from
x
∗
0 =
(
1−2ǫ−c
2−4ǫ ,
c
1−2ǫ , 0
)
by mutation, has eigenvalues
with a negative real part proportional to µ [20]. It im-
plies that mutation mixes up the populations of different
strategies so that the system always ends up with the
same polymorphic state. In either case, the initial condi-
tion eventually becomes irrelevant. Our finding implies
that if both x
WSLS
and µ are turned on, the symmetry un-
der time reversal and AllC-AllD exchange can break in a
more nontrivial way. In particular, we have seen that mu-
tation, induced by the inherent microscopic randomness
of the environment, produces unpredictability on evolu-
tionary scales. One might say that this is not unexpected
because mutation per se is a random event which makes
the evolutionary path deviate from the one determined by
the initial condition. However, we are dealing with mu-
tation in a fully deterministic manner in Eq. (3), and the
effect of mutation is not just small perturbation added
to a deterministic path, but the FP structure itself seems
to experience non-perturbative changes. The chaotic dy-
namics is directional in a rather subtle sense that the
path reveals more and more information of the initial
condition as time goes by. Differently from the above
cases, this additional information is not a function of the
5current state exclusively, but something evaluated with
reference to history [21]. Historical contingency should
be understood in this respect, considering that not all
history-dependent systems are chaotic.
V. SUMMARY
In summary, we have presented numerical evidence
that chaos exists in the 3D continuous-time RD with mu-
tation among the four representative strategies of the PD
game, i.e., AllC, AllD, TFT, and WSLS. Even if one con-
siders a more general strategy space, it will contain these
four in most cases, and our findings will remain valid in
the corresponding subspace. The model, originally moti-
vated by selection against the better for the population,
provides a simple analytic picture for non-progressionism,
showing various facets of mutation: It generates unpre-
dictability with exerting non-perturbative effects on evo-
lutionary paths and breaks symmetry of a subsystem un-
der time reversal. The strategic interaction considered
here is one of the most intensively studied subjects in
evolutionary game theory, so our finding suggests that
chaos can be more prevalent than previously known.
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Appendix A: Derivation of long-term payoff aij
As mentioned in the main text, we denote by qαβ (rβα)
the probability that the player (coplayer) with strategy
i (j) cooperates at the next round, given that the state
of player’s and coplayer’s moves is (α, β) at the current
round. Here α, β ∈ {C,D}. We summarize the values of
qαβ for each strategy i ∈ S = {AllC, AllD, TFT, WSLS}
as follows:
(α, β) AllC AllD TFT WSLS
(C,C) 1 0 1 1
(C,D) 1 0 0 0
(D,C) 1 0 1 0
(D,D) 1 0 0 1
The values of rβα for the coplayer with strategy j can be
similarly assigned.
In the presence of implementation error with proba-
bility ǫ ∈ (0, 1), the probabilities of cooperating are ef-
fectively changed to q′αβ = (1 − ǫ)qαβ + ǫ(1 − qαβ) and
r′βα = (1 − ǫ)rβα + ǫ(1 − rβα), respectively. By defining
q¯′αβ ≡ 1 − q
′
αβ and r¯
′
βα ≡ 1 − r
′
βα, the transition matrix
between the current and next states is written as
M =


q′
CC
r′
CC
q′
CD
r′
DC
q′
DC
r′
CD
q′
DD
r′
DD
q′
CC
r¯′
CC
q′
CD
r¯′
DC
q′
DC
r¯′
CD
q′
DD
r¯′
DD
q¯′
CC
r′
CC
q¯′
CD
r′
DC
q¯′
DC
r′
CD
q¯′
DD
r′
DD
q¯′
CC
r¯′
CC
q¯′
CD
r¯′
DC
q¯′
DC
r¯′
CD
q¯′
DD
r¯′
DD

 . (A1)
Then, from the equation of M~v = ~v, we obtain the sta-
tionary solution as ~v = (v
CC
, v
CD
, v
DC
, v
DD
), which is a
unique right eigenvector of the matrix M . Here we im-
pose the normalization for ~v using v
CC
+ v
CD
+ v
DC
+
v
DD
= 1. Then vαβ can be interpreted as the stationary
probability of finding the state (α, β) when players with
strategies i and j play the game. The results of ~v for
all combinations of i and j are summarized in Table A.1.
Once ~v is obtained, we calculate the long-term payoff aij
that the strategy i obtains against j, by taking the inner
product between ~v and the payoff vector such that
aij = ~v · (b− c,−c, b, 0). (A2)
The long-term payoffs aij for all possible pairs of i and j
are presented in Table A.2. Note that with ǫ > 0, initial
states are irrelevant in the long run.
Appendix B: FP analysis of the replicator dynamics
when µ = 0
In order to better understand the RD in Eq. (3) in
the main text, we first analyze the mutation-free case,
i.e., when µ = 0. Let us define x ≡ (x
AllD
, x
TFT
, x
WSLS
),
where xi denotes the fraction of strategy i. From the set
of equations
0 =
dxi
dt
= fi(µ = 0) = pixi − 〈p〉xi (B1)
6TABLE A.1. Stationary probability distributions vαβ of finding the state (α, β) when strategy i plays against j, where (α, β)
can be one of the four states: (C,C), (C,D), (D,C), and (D,D).
i j v
CC
v
CD
v
DC
v
DD
AllC
AllC (1− ǫ)2 ǫ(1− ǫ) ǫ(1− ǫ) ǫ2
AllD ǫ(1− ǫ) (1− ǫ)2 ǫ2 ǫ(1− ǫ)
TFT 1− 3ǫ + 4ǫ2 − 2ǫ3 2ǫ(1− ǫ)2 ǫ(1− 2ǫ− 2ǫ2) 2ǫ2(1− ǫ)
WSLS (1− ǫ)/2 (1− ǫ)/2 ǫ/2 ǫ/2
AllD
AllC ǫ(1− ǫ) ǫ2 (1− ǫ)2 ǫ(1− ǫ)
AllD ǫ2 ǫ(1− ǫ) ǫ(1− ǫ) (1− ǫ)2
TFT 2ǫ2(1− ǫ) ǫ(1− 2ǫ− 2ǫ2) 2ǫ(1− ǫ)2 1− 3ǫ + 4ǫ2 − 2ǫ3
WSLS ǫ/2 ǫ/2 (1− ǫ)/2 (1− ǫ)/2
TFT
AllC 1− 3ǫ + 4ǫ2 − 2ǫ3 ǫ(1− 2ǫ+ 2ǫ2) 2ǫ(1− ǫ)2 2ǫ2(1− ǫ)
AllD 2ǫ2(1− ǫ) 2ǫ(1− ǫ)2 ǫ(1− 2ǫ+ 2ǫ2) 1− 3ǫ + 4ǫ2 − 2ǫ3
TFT 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
WSLS 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
WSLS
AllC (1− ǫ)/2 ǫ/2 (1− ǫ)/2 ǫ/2
AllD ǫ/2 (1− ǫ)/2 ǫ/2 (1− ǫ)/2
TFT 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
WSLS 1− 4ǫ + 7ǫ2 − 4ǫ3 ǫ(1− ǫ) ǫ(1− ǫ) ǫ(2− 5ǫ + 4ǫ2)
TABLE A.2. Long-term payoff aij that strategy i (leftmost
column) obtains against j (top row).
AllC AllD TFT WSLS
AllC (b−c)(1−ǫ) bǫ− c(1− ǫ) b(1 − 2ǫ +
2ǫ2) − c(1−
ǫ)
b
2
− c(1− ǫ)
AllD b(1− ǫ)− cǫ (b− c)ǫ (2b(1 − ǫ) −
c)ǫ
1
2
(b− 2cǫ)
TFT b(1 − ǫ) −
c(1 − 2ǫ −
2ǫ2)
(b − 2c(1 −
ǫ))ǫ
b−c
2
b−c
2
WSLS b(1− ǫ)− c
2
bǫ− c
2
b−c
2
(b − c)(1 −
3ǫ + 6ǫ2 −
4ǫ3)
for all i ∈ S, we analytically find 11 different FP’s x∗0 as
follows:
x
∗
0 =


(1, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 0)
(0, 0,− c(1−2ǫ)2(b−c))
(0, 2cǫ(b−c)(1−2ǫ) , 0)
( b(1−2ǫ)−c2b(1−2ǫ) ,
c
b(1−2ǫ) , 0)
( b(1−2ǫ)−c(b−c)(1−2ǫ) ,
2cǫ
(b−c)(1−2ǫ) , 0)
( (b−c)(1−2ǫ)
2−c
(b−c)(1−2ǫ)2 , 0,
c
(b−c)(1−2ǫ)2 )
(0, c[2(b−c)ǫ(1−2ǫ)−c](1−2ǫ)[(b−c)2(1−2ǫ)−bc] ,
c[b(2ǫ−1)+c]
(1−2ǫ)[(b−c)2(1−2ǫ)+bc])
( (b−c)[b(1−2ǫ)−c](b−c)2(1−2ǫ)+bc ,
c[2(b−c)ǫ(1−2ǫ)+c]
(1−2ǫ)[(b−c)2(1−2ǫ)+bc] ,
c[b(1−2ǫ)−c]
(1−2ǫ)[(b−c)2(1−2ǫ)−bc] ).
.
(B2)
By the linear stability analysis, we find that only one
FP x∗0 = (1, 0, 0), implying xAllD = 1, is stable for the
-1
 0
 1
 0  0.5  1
(a)
λ
c
 0  0.5  1
(b)
 
c
FIG. B.1. (Color online) (a) Eigenvalues for the first FP of
Eq. (B2), x∗0 = (x
∗
AllD
, x∗
TFT
, x∗
WSLS
) = (1, 0, 0). All of the
eigenvalues are negative for the entire range of c. We set
b = 1 without loss of generality and choose ǫ = 10−2. (b)
Eigenvalues for another FP (0, 0, 1). The largest eigenvalue is
negative for c < cth. The threshold value cth is analytically
obtained in Eq. (B4).
entire range of c, confirmed by the negativity of all eigen-
values, as shown in Fig. B.1(a). This result is somehow
consistent with the fact that this FP is numerically ob-
served for the entire range of c even when µ > 0, as
depicted in Fig. 1(a) in the main text. We are also inter-
ested in another FP x∗0 = (0, 0, 1), i.e., xWSLS = 1. It is
found that the largest eigenvalue is negative for c < cth
with some threshold cth, implying that the FP is stable.
However, it becomes positive for c > cth, implying unsta-
bility of the FP. See Fig. B.1(b). This largest eigenvalue
is calculated as
λ =
(
ǫ−
1
2
){
b(1− 2ǫ)2 − 2c[2(ǫ− 1)ǫ+ 1]
}
, (B3)
from which we can define cth as follows:
cth =
b(1− 2ǫ)2
2(1− 2ǫ+ 2ǫ2)
≈ b
(
1
2
− ǫ
)
. (B4)
All the other FP’s turn out to be unstable.
7Appendix C: Positive Lyapunov exponents
For chaotic dynamics, the largest Lyapunov exponent
is positive. The problem arises when its value is so small
that the numerical error of the algorithm has the same
order of magnitude. Suppose that we have a continu-
ous orbit in a bounded three-dimensional region and its
Lyapunov exponents are sorted in descending order, i.e.,
λ1 > λ2 > λ3. It is well-known that one of the Lya-
punov exponents must be zero for a continuous orbit.
We can also be sure that λ3 must be negative for the fol-
lowing reason: the information dimension of an attractor
is bounded from above by the Kaplan-Yorke formula,
DKY = j +
∑j
i=1 λi
|λj+1|
, (C1)
where j satisfies
∑j
i=1 λi > 0 and
∑j+1
i=1 λi < 0. In our
case, the dimension cannot be greater than three, which
means that j ≤ 2. From
∑3
i=1 λi < 0, it follows that
λ3 < 0.
Based on these results, we draw the following conclu-
sions: if we have a chaotic orbit, it implies that λ1 > 0
whereas λ2 is zero. Therefore, we have the following in-
equality,
λ1 + λ2 > 0. (C2)
On the other hand, if λ1 is actually zero but numerically
estimated as a tiny positive number, λ1 + λ2 is likely to
be negative because of λ2. The point is that Eq. (C2)
provides a sharp criterion to check the positivity of λ1,
which can sometimes be obscure if we observe λ1 only.
The Lyapunov exponents depicted in Fig. 1 of the main
text are estimated as positive in this way.
Appendix D: Perturbative analysis for small positive
µ
Based on the understanding of the mutation-free case
in Appendix B, we now analyze a more general case with
µ > 0. As it is not straightforward to obtain the FP’s
of the RD in Eq. (3) in the main text, we take the per-
turbative approach. More specifically, we apply New-
ton’s method in which each FP x∗0 for µ = 0 serves as a
trial solution. The first order Taylor expansion around
the FP x∗0 = (x
∗
0,AllD
, x∗
0,TFT
, x∗
0,WSLS
) yields the following
equation:
0 =

 fAllD(x
∗)
f
TFT
(x∗)
f
WSLS
(x∗)

 =

 fAllD(x
∗
0)
f
TFT
(x∗0)
f
WSLS
(x∗0)


+


∂f
AllD
∂x
AllD
∂f
AllD
∂x
TFT
∂f
AllD
∂x
WSLS
∂f
TFT
∂x
AllD
∂f
TFT
∂x
TFT
∂f
TFT
∂x
WSLS
∂f
WSLS
∂x
AllD
∂f
WSLS
∂x
TFT
∂f
WSLS
∂x
WSLS



 x
∗
AllD
− x∗
0,AllD
x∗
TFT
− x∗
0,TFT
x∗
WSLS
− x∗
0,WSLS

 ,
(D1)
where x∗ = (x∗
AllD
, x∗
TFT
, x∗
WSLS
) denotes the correspond-
ing perturbative solution. The matrix in the above equa-
tion is indeed Jacobian matrix J =
{
∂fi
∂xj
}
calculated at
x = x∗0. If J(x
∗
0) has an inverse, by arranging Eq. (D1),
we get

 x
∗
AllD
x∗
TFT
x∗
WSLS

 ≈

 x
∗
0,AllD
x∗
0,TFT
x∗
0,WSLS

− J−1

 fAllD(x
∗
0)
f
TFT
(x∗0)
f
WSLS
(x∗0)

 . (D2)
Here, we would like to note that even when J(x∗0) has no
inverse, one can first calculate J(x)−1, then substitute x
by x∗0 to obtain the result x
∗ in Eq. (5b). Then, based on
numerical observations, we pick up three FP’s for µ = 0,
i.e., (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), and ( b(1−2ǫ)−c2b(1−2ǫ) ,
c
b(1−2ǫ) , 0). For ex-
ample, the last one is chosen because it behaves similarly
to x¯ ≈ (1−c2 , c, η) with small positive η, when the time
average is taken over the cycle (see the main text). We
will denote this last FP as xˆ∗0. By applying Newton’s
method to these FP’s, we obtain the following perturba-
tive solutions:
8x
∗ ≈




1
0
0

 +µ


(3ǫ+1)(b−c)
3c−6cǫ
− (b−c)3c−6cǫ
2ǫ(b−c)
3c(2ǫ−1)




0
0
1

 +µ


−
2((ǫ−1)(4ǫ2−2ǫ+1)(b−c))
3((2ǫ−1)(b(1−2ǫ)2−2c(2(ǫ−1)ǫ+1)))
1
3
(
1
(2ǫ−1)3 − 1
)
2(ǫ−1)(4ǫ2−2ǫ+1)(3b2(1−2ǫ)4−6bc(1−2ǫ)4+2c2(12(ǫ−1)ǫ(2(ǫ−1)ǫ+1)+1))
3(2ǫ−1)3(b(1−2ǫ)2−4c(ǫ−1)ǫ)(b(1−2ǫ)2−2c(2(ǫ−1)ǫ+1))




b(1−2ǫ)−c
2b(1−2ǫ)
c
b(1−2ǫ)
0

 +µ


(b−c)(2ǫ(b+c)−5b−c)(b(2ǫ−1)+4c)
24c2(2ǫ−1)(b(2ǫ−1)+c)
0
− ((b−c)(b+c)(b(2ǫ−1)+4c))12(c2(b(2ǫ−1)+c))

+


1
8
0
− 14

 .
(D3)
We find that a term of O(1) appears for xˆ∗0 because
of µ ≪ 1, implying that the perturbative approach fails
here. The result can be understood by directly calculat-
ing J(x∗0) for µ→ 0:
J
(
b(1− 2ǫ)− c
2b(1− 2ǫ)
,
c
b(1− 2ǫ)
, 0
)
=
(c− b(1− 2ǫ))
4b2

 2c
2 c2 + b2(1 − 2ǫ) c2
−4c2 −2c2 −2c2
0 0 0

 .
(D4)
This Jacobian matrix has zeros in the bottom row be-
cause ∇f
WSLS
→ 0 in the limit of zero mutation. In
fact, one can readily check that f
WSLS
becomes a con-
stant function in this limit for every x such that x
TFT
=
1 − 2x
AllD
and x
WSLS
= 0. The FP xˆ∗0 also satisfies this
condition, so every derivative vanishes there along the
direction of (1,−2, 0). As a consequence, even if we in-
clude higher-order derivatives in the Taylor expansion
[Eq. (D1)], the resulting matrices will always be singu-
lar. For example, the Hessian matrix H ≡
{
∂2f
WSLS
∂xi∂xj
}
for the second-derivative test is obtained as
H(xˆ∗0) =


0 0 c
2(−1+2ǫ)
b
0 0 c
2(−1+2ǫ)
b
c2(−1+2ǫ)
b
c2(−1+2ǫ)
2b
c2−b2(1−2ǫ)2−bc(1−2ǫ)3
b


(D5)
when µ → 0. It is straightforward to see that it has an
eigenvector (1,−2, 0) associated with the eigenvalue zero,
which makes the test inconclusive.
Appendix E: Symmetry of replicator dynamics
Recall that RD in this work is defined as
dxi
dt
= fi ≡ (1−µ)pixi −〈p〉xi+
µ
|S| − 1
∑
j 6=i
pjxj , (E1)
where pi =
∑
i aijxj and 〈p〉 ≡
∑
i pixi =∑
ij aijxixj . The long-term payoff aij is given in Ta-
ble A.2. We explicitly write the functional dependence
as fi(xAllC , xAllD , xWSLS ) by choosing three independent
variables. Note that we have just chosen x
AllC
as an in-
dependent variable instead of x
TFT
as we have done in
other parts of the paper. It is because this set of inde-
pendent variables show the symmetry most clearly. After
some algebra, we can readily see the following equality:
f
AllC
(x1, x2,x3) + fAllD(x2, x1, x3)
=
b− c
3
(1 + x3)[µ(1 + x3)− x1(4µ+ 3x3)].
(E2)
It is important to note that x1 and x2 exchange the po-
sitions in evaluating f
AllD
. Let us set µ and x3 to zero
so that the right-hand side vanishes altogether. We may
suppress the dependence on x3 which is fixed, so the re-
sult is
f
AllC
(x1, x2) = −fAllD(x2, x1). (E3)
By construction, we already have
dx
AllC
dt
= f
AllC
(x
AllC
, x
AllD
) (E4)
dx
AllD
dt
= f
AllD
(x
AllC
, x
AllD
). (E5)
We combine Eqs. (E3) to (E5) to obtain
dx
AllC
dt
= −f
AllD
(x
AllD
, x
AllC
) (E6)
dx
AllD
dt
= −f
AllC
(x
AllD
, x
AllC
). (E7)
Now, let us define τ ≡ −t to rewrite the equations as
dx
AllC
dτ
= f
AllD
(x
AllD
, x
AllC
) (E8)
dx
AllD
dτ
= f
AllC
(x
AllD
, x
AllC
). (E9)
Finally, the variables are relabeled as X
AlC
≡ x
AllD
and
X
AlD
≡ x
AllC
, and we end up with the following set of
equations,
dX
AllD
dτ
= f
AllD
(X
AllC
, X
AllD
) (E10)
dX
AllC
dτ
= f
AllC
(X
AllC
, X
AllD
), (E11)
9which are formally identical to the original ones
[Eqs. (E4) and (E5)].
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